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WITTGENSTEIN AND REALISM 
Michael Scott 
It is clear from both his writings and lectures on religion that Wittgenstein 
thought that there are many differences in the standards and forms of justi-
fication informing religious and scientific discourses. However, the evi-
dence of such differences can be used to support two quite different and 
conflicting lines of argument. On one apparently realist argument, the dif-
ferences are taken to show that religious discourse describes different kinds 
of fact (or offers different kinds of description) to scientific discourse; on the 
other seemingly antirealist argument, the differences show that religious 
discourse does not have a descriptive function at all. This paper evaluates 
these arguments both as contributions to the debate concerning religious 
realism and as interpretations of Wittgenstein. 
According to non-cognitivist theories of religious language, religious state-
ments are expressions of attitudes, stances or emotions. R. B. Braithwaite, 
for example, proposed that religious assertions should be regarded lias pri-
marily evincing feelings or emotions" and that "it is the intention to believe 
which constitutes what is known as a religious conviction.'" One notable 
feature of non-cognitivism is that it provides an account of religious state-
ments that is compatible with a verificationist theory of meaning, that is, 
one which makes the empirical verifiability of a statement a prerequisite of 
its factual meaning. The difficulty in specifying verification conditions for 
religious statements will only pose a problem if we take them to assert 
facts, and this is what the non-cognitivist denies. Indeed, Braithwaite 
advanced his theory precisely on the grounds that the verificationists had 
shown that religious statements, like ethical ones, lack truth evaluative 
content. Even A. J. Ayer allowed that ethical claims, being empirically 
unverifiable and so factually contentless, have an expressive function. 2 
Since he took theological claims to be in the same predicament as ethical 
ones, he would presumably have had no objection in principle to extend-
ing the same courtesy to them. Of course, the verification principle is no 
longer thought to constitute the serious challenge to religious claims it once 
was. Two well known arguments are, first, that many central religious 
claims may after all be verifiable, and second, that the positivists were 
wrong from the outset in connecting meaning so closely with empirical 
verification.' These arguments may be enough to stave off the threat to the 
meaning of religious statements, but the need to state a position on the rel-
evance of verification for religious language persists. For the role given to 
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verification will still have a bearing on the account given of religious truth. 
Philosophers of religion influenced by Wittgenstein have tended to follow 
• the second line of resistance to verificationism, i.e., it was a mistake to give 
such prominence to the notion of empirical verification. Where the verifica-
tionist goes wrong, on this view, is not in the attention to verification condi-
tions per se, but in insisting that in any field of discourse a particular type of 
verification - empirical verification - is the only one suitable. The meaning of 
a religious statement, for example, is shown primarily by its use in religious 
discourse rather than in scientific discourse. Consequently, the philosophical 
task should be to describe this use, that is, the standards and conditions under 
which the statement may be asserted or believed in religious discourse. So 
the descriptive method is still concerned with verification, where this is 
understood to cover whatever counts in determining the truth of statements 
within religious discourse, even when this includes kinds of "evidence" -
again very broadly conceived - that would not be countenanced in scientific 
practice. This approach does not presuppose that scientific standards are not 
operative within religious discourse, or that religious standards fall short of 
scientific respectability. However, it does require that we should be open to 
the possibility of different standards operating in different discourses. 
Now, it is clear from both his writings and lectures on religion that 
Wittgenstein thought that there are many differences in the standards and 
forms of justification informing religious and scientific discourses. His 
remarks on the subject seem largely to consist in describing these differ-
ences. Some interpreters of Wittgenstein have taken him to be arguing for 
the controversial conclusion - nowhere explicitly endorsed by Wittgenstein 
- that we may be justified in believing or asserting religious statements 
independently of what may be established in scientific investigation. 
However, I will not be concerned in this paper with the degree to which sci-
entific and religious discourses are different or possess different standards 
of justification or are independent. Rather, I will look at the philosophical 
implications which can be drawn from the evidence of differences between 
the discourses. For this evidence admits two different readings, and can be 
used to support two quite different and even conflicting lines of argument. 
On one argument, the differences reflect only the different things that are 
counted as true in different discourses, on the other, the differences are 
taken as indicating that it is not the function of religious statements to assert 
truths but rather express attitudes. Wittgenstein himself gives little guid-
ance as to how the differences should be understood - whether they show 
that religious discourse describes different kinds of facts (or offers different 
kinds of description) than scientific discourse does, or that religious dis-
course does not have a descriptive function. I will argue that this poses not 
only a dilemma for interpreters of Wittgenstein, but also the problem of two 
opposing Wittgensteinian positions on the nature of religious language. 
1. Overview of the Two Arguments 
On one approach, religious truths, descriptions, facts, etc., are just state-
ments that qualify as true, descriptive or factual according to the standards 
of religious discourse. This is not to say, of course, that it is at all easy to 
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identify any particular religious truth. The point is rather that religious dis-
course, just by possessing standards (as well as a degree of syntactic com-
plexity) satisfies the conditions required for its statements to assert truths 
or falsehoods. The simplest way of showing this (though not the only 
way)," is to suppose that the content of the truth predicate is given by 
instances of the disquotational schema: 
(DS) "s" is true iff S. 
Nothing more informative or substantive can in general be said about 
truth. With this kind of minimal strategy we can win through to a concept 
of religious truth with some ease. We simply observe that religious dis-
course supports the use of a truth predicate that satisfies DS. Instead of 
insisting on demanding metaphysical standards for truth, reference, fact, 
etc., such as a robust correspondence condition (i.e., one which does not 
trivially follow from DS), we instead opt for unprovocative minimalism 
about these concepts. No philosophical mileage is made, for example, from 
the fact that the standards of religious discourse may differ from those in 
science, other than to show the variety of different things that we count as 
true or as determining truth. Religious truths are not taken to be compro-
mised by the evidence of these differences. 
This is currently a popular strategy. To take just one example (I will give 
some others in Section 4), Hilary Putnam comments on reference in reli-
gious discourse: 
The use of religious language is both like and unlike ordinary cases 
of reference: but to ask whether it is "really" reference or "not really" 
reference is to be in a muddle. There is no essence of reference ... the 
way to understand religious language isn't to try to apply some 
metaphysical classification of possible forms of discourse.s 
Such an approach seems very much of a piece with Wittgenstein's writings 
on "family resemblance" concepts and his apparent support for a form of 
minimalism about truth: "For what does a proposition's "being true" mean? 
"p" is true = p. (That is the answer.)"6 In the same way we can have religious 
facts, descriptions, etc., just so long as the disciplined use of these concepts 
is supported in the discourse. I will call this position minimal realism. It is 
realist (in at least one important sense) by virtue of allowing that religious 
claims may refer, describe, be true, etc., and this realism emerges from tak-
ing a minimalist position on truth and other realism-relevant features. 
However, Wittgenstein's writings can be developed in a quite different 
direction, more sympathetic to non-cognitivism. For Wittgenstein's empha-
sis on the difference between religious and scientific discourse, can be read 
as attempting to show that religious claims should be seen as having a dif-
ferent function than scientific claims. And here a second argument emerges, 
one which takes the differences between religious and scientific (or in gen-
eral fact-stating) language, to show that religious discourse has a largely 
expressive purpose. Here, religious statements are taken to be compro-
mised by the evidence of their differences from scientific statements: they 
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are shown to be non-descriptive. If a statement is "true" it is not by virtue 
of accurately representing a real state of affairs. I will call this theory non-
factualism. I take non-factualism to be a form of antirealism, for it is 
opposed to the idea that religious statements are true, factual or descriptive 
in the way that realists - even minimal realists - say that they are. As an 
account of Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion, non-factualism is sup-
ported by B. R. Tilghman? and, for several other areas of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy, by Simon Blackburn.8 
The contrasting approaches of non-factualism and minimal realism in 
the interpretation of Wittgenstein are reflected in the two strikingly differ-
ent "standard" criticisms of Wittgensteinian positions in philosophy of reli-
gion. One frequently cited argument is that Wittgensteinianism is just 
repackaged non-cognitivism/ a sophisticated form of Braithwaite's theory 
misleadingly dressed up to look like a philosophically neutral description 
of religious language. This is presumably directed against only the non-fac-
tualist interpretation of Wittgenstein's writings, which takes religious 
claims to have an expressive function, for minimal realism allows that reli-
gious claims may be true, factual, descriptive, etc. The second argument is 
that Wittgensteinianism is a form of fideism that aims to preserve the dis-
course by placing it in strict quarantine from external and specifically sci-
entific criticism.1O This objection may apply to a minimal realist interpreta-
tion of Wittgenstein but it clearly has little bearing on non-factualism. For 
the non-factualist, the issue of preserving religious claims from scientific 
criticism does not arise, because it is not the function of religious discourse 
to assert facts. These two objections point up the two different ways of 
interpreting Wittgenstein that I have outlined. It is also the case that the 
two objections cannot both be right - a fact not usually noted by writers 
who set out both objections as good grounds for rejecting Wittgenstein's 
views on religious language. For the charge of fideism proceeds with the 
assumption that the truth of many central religious beliefs would be at 
least challenged, if not shown to be mostly in error, were they exposed to 
scientific evaluation. The argument that Wittgenstein takes religious state-
ments to be expressions of attitudes is at cross-purposes with this assump-
tion. Scientific developments may engender non-religious or anti-religious 
attitudes, but this is quite different from falsifying religious statements. 
The critic of Wittgenstein may still uphold both lines of objection, provided 
it is understood that they apply to different interpretations of Wittgenstein. 
However, I hope to show in this paper that in neither case are they effec-
tive forms of opposition as they are currently presented. 
Despite their seeming to be at odds, elements of both minimal realism 
and non-factualism are often found in interpretations of Wittgenstein's 
writings and lectures on religion. On the one hand, there is a respect for the 
grammar of religious discourse along with discourse-relative accounts of 
truth and reference, that one would expect to lead to a form of minimal 
realism. On the other hand, there is an emphasis on the deceptiveness of 
the similarities between the (superficial) form of religious and empirical 
statements, and the non-descriptive character of the indicative statements 
of religious discourse, which suggests a non-factualist account. The mini-
malism of minimal realism is run alongside the differences asserted by 
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non-factualists, and the direction in which these ideas should be developed 
is all too often left unclear. 
Now, those non-factualist accounts of Wittgenstein's philosophy of reli-
gion in which his sympathy for minimalism also figure, are in danger of 
running into a serious difficulty, spelled out by Paul Boghossian,lI Crispin 
Wright12 and Paul Horwich.13 It is that once truth is conceded as a meta-
physically lightweight notion, there seems no basis to resist the further 
concession that statements which count as true according to the standards 
of the discourse, are indeed true. Both religious and ethical discourse 
exhibit syntactical complexity (negation, conditionalisation, etc.) and also a 
degree of internal discipline (there are various standards for the proper use 
of their sentences). So the truth predicate operating in ethical or religious 
discourse should comfortably satisfy any minimal requirements for truth 
and consequently any indicative religious statement is at least a candidate 
for asserting a truth. Minimalism about truth slips easily into minimal real-
ism. It seems to follow that a non-factualist cannot be a minimalist about 
truth. Notably, A. J. Ayer, who advanced both a deflationary theory of 
truth and a non-factualist account of ethics, is cited as falling foul of this 
problem.14 It is also notable that many religious non-realists who advance a 
form of non-factualism also criticise robust notions of truth - in particular 
correspondence theories - without addressing the impending difficulty. If 
truth is not metaphysically substantial, what grounds are there for accept-
ing the non-factualist's claim that religious statements do not assert truths, 
despite their seeming to do so? 
The problem is not disastrous for the non-factualist attracted to minimal-
ism. A minimalist about truth can consistently maintain non-factualism for 
a discourse if the statements of that discourse do not qualify for truth, even 
of a minimal sort. A number of recent debates in ethics have hinged on the 
question of whether a notion of "truth aptness" or "proposition" can be 
defended which the statements of ethical discourse fail to satisfy.1s 
However, having noted the potential tension between truth minimalism 
and non-factualism, I will not be addressing the prospects for a successful 
form of minimalist non-factualism. My interest here is in the fact that a form 
of religious realism - minimal realism, and a form of religious antirealism -
non-factualism, both seem able to draw support from Wittgenstein's writ-
ings. I will look at these positions in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 5, I will set 
out the difficulties in determining which view Wittgenstein himself adopt-
ed, before attempting to resolve the issue in Section 6. I will begin, however, 
with an explanation of the terms of the debate. 
II. Irrealism 
To clarify the term "non-factualism", I will put it in the context of the dif-
ferent kinds of irrealism that may be adopted with regard to a field of dis-
course. Following Paul Boghossian, irrealism may be defined as "the view 
that no real properties answer to the central predicates of the region [of dis-
course] in question." (157) There are two irrealist strategies. First, error theo-
retic irrealism, which is the view that the declarative sentences of the dis-
course in question are all false. The discourse's predicates denote properties, 
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but there are no such properties: the states of affairs we aspire to describe in 
the discourse do not obtain. Error theorists usually go on to propose either 
(a) elimination of the defective discourse, perhaps replacing it with a differ-
ent or substantially revised discourse whose predicates do successfully pick 
out properties, or (b) instrumentalism, the view that despite the discourse's 
failure to express truths, it serves some other purpose for which it deserves 
to be left largely intact. The latter approach will likely be more desirable in 
those cases where the disputed discourse has proved conspicuously suc-
cessful. Examples of error theories include Hartry Field's account of mathe-
matics/6 and J. L. Mackie's views on ethics.17 Mackie contends that there are 
no ethical properties of a kind that could answer to the predicates central to 
ethical discourse. Since there are no such properties, ordinary moral 
thought is systematically mistaken. Field puts forward a broadly similar 
argument for mathematical discourse. He argues that there are no abstract 
mathematical entities of the sort that pure (non-vacuous) mathematical 
statements seem to require to be true. These statements aim to be descrip-
tive, but there is no mathematical realm for them to describe. An error theo-
rist about religious discourse would maintain that all members of the class 
of predicates central to religious discourse have uniformly empty exten-
sions; that is, declarative religious statements are false. 
A second irrealist strategy is non-factualism. A non-factualist about 
some region of discourse F maintains that 
although F's declarative sentences appear to express genuine pred-
icative judgements, that appearance is wholly illusory. In actual fact . 
. . F's predicates do not denote properties; nor, as a result, do its 
declarative sentences express genuine predicative judgements, 
equipped with truth conditions: seeing as such sentences would be 
making no claim about the world, so nothing about the world could 
render them true or false. IS 
Unlike the error theorist, the non-factualist denies that the declarative 
statements of the discourse in question are truth apt. That is, the statements 
are not even in the business of stating truths. A central problem for non-
factualist accounts is the logical and syntactic features that the statements 
of the discourse are able to support. A notoriously difficult range of exam-
ples, much discussed in ethical discourse, gives rise to the Frege-Geach 
argument. Consider those cases in which an ethical judgement is simply 
asserted, for instance, "It is wrong to break promises." In such cases the 
non-factualist has a fairly simple story to tell about the function of the 
assertion: it simply expresses an attitude towards the object of the judge-
ment, the breaking of promises. But what should the non-factualist say 
about ethical statements occurring in contexts in which they are not assert-
ed, such as "If it is wrong to break promises, it is wrong make promises 
that you do not intend to keep." In this sentence, no attitude towards 
breaking promises is expressed. It would not do to argue that the state-
ment "It is wrong to break promises" means something different when it is 
asserted than when it is the antecedent of the conditional. Because, "it is 
wrong to break promises" in its asserted and conditional contexts can be 
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put together to form a valid argument with the conclusion "It is wrong to 
make promises you do not intend to keep."19 Conditionals are not, of 
course, the only feature of ethical discourse that will be a problem for the 
non-factualist. Any ethical claim that takes a form other than the simple 
expression of ethical conviction will require additional explanation. This 
line of argument also applies to the non-factualist position in other dis-
courses, such as religious non-factualism.20 
The Frege-Geach argument is damaging to some traditional forms of 
non-factualism, such as Braithwaite's, where the discourse in question 
exhibits the relevant syntactical features. But it would be a mistake to sup-
pose that it constitutes a conclusive argument against more sophisticated 
forms of non-factualism, which I will call expressivism. For explanations of 
these features in ethical discourse have been put forward by Allan 
Gibbard21 and Simon Blackburn22• Blackburn, in particular, pursues a quasi-
realist project, which aims to show how all the characteristics of a discourse 
that are supposedly distinctive of realism can be made from non-represen-
tational ingredients. Our use of concepts such as truth, knowledge, fact, 
etc., can consequently be engaged in by the expressivist without embar-
rassment: "starting from a recognisably anti-realist position, [the quasi-
realist] finds himself increasingly able to mimic the intellectual practices 
supposedly distinctive of realism."23 The way in which this might be done 
is indicated by Blackburn's account of ethical judgement: 
If practical life were simpler its pressures could be voiced by a simpler 
linguistic method: the 'Boo! - Hooray!' language of emotivism, or the 
simple issuing of overt prescriptions, as in the Decalogue. But once 
reflection starts up and we have to think about competing practical 
pressures, we need a richer language, and this is what we have. We 
have given the discourse what I call its proposition surface. Weare 
pretty casual about doing that in any event: Consider the usual expres-
sion of gustatory delight 'That's yummy' instead of just 'yummy!'24 
The propositional surface does not emerge merely from expressions of atti-
tude, but from attitudes and sensibilities that are subject to criticism and 
argument, and the demands of consistency and clarity that are the result of 
various "practical pressures."25 The resulting expressivist account of the 
disputed discourse, informed by quasi-realist techniques, will end up look-
ing on the surface more in sympathy with realism that non-factualism. For 
instance, talk about truth and falsity, which forms a crucial part of the real-
ist's account, will have its analogue in the quasi-realist's rival proposals 
about the discourse's function. The expressivist has no intention to prohibit 
our saying that the statements of the disputed discourse are true or false. 
On the quasi-realist side, calling a statement true has the function of assert-
ing the statement, without the implication that the statement is articulating 
a proposition rather than expressing an attitude. 
Given the quasi-realist's aim of appropriating the realism-relevant fea-
tures of a discourse without taking on any commitment to realism, the pro-
ject may seem to be self-defeating. If it is allowed that statements that the 
non-factualist takes to express attitudes may also be (quasi) descriptive, 
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true, factual etc., doesn't this undermine the distinction with which the 
quasi-realist project began, between claims that express attitudes and gen-
uine claims with truth evaluative content? Blackburn avoids this problem 
by relocating this contrast in the different explanations given for the propo-
sitional surface, rather than in the propositional surface itself. The quasi-
realist's contribution lies in 
Eschewing false metaphysical, or natural, explanations for our 
propensities, and substituting ones which enable us to see ourselves 
better. The theory lies not in the words we end up using, but in the 
hard-earned title to use them; it is this process, not the bare end point, 
which matters.26 
Unlike the realist, the quasi-realist'S explanation of how we come to talk of 
the truth or falsity of statements of a discourse will not involve the dis-
course addressing a real subject matter. It will show that we can talk in 
these terms without giving the discourse's statements the status of having 
genuine and truth evaluable contents. Since Blackburn presents one of the 
most promising forms of expressivism, and the most persuasive interpreta-
tion of Wittgenstein as an expressivist, it is his variety of non-factualism 
that I will address in this paper.27 
Two final points. First, a distinction can be made between non-factual-
ists about properties who go on to deny the existence of the bearers of 
those properties, and those who do not. Neil Tennant gives the example of 
a realist about actions who is a non-factualist about the moral properties of 
actions.2S One might tentatively characterise John Hick as an example of a 
non-factualist of this type. Hick appears to wish to adopt a non-factualist 
account of divine properties, while maintaining realism about the bearer of 
those properties.29 Second, expressivist non-factualism stands in contrast 
with those forms of instrumentalism which result from scepticism about 
the subject matter of the discourse. The instrumentalist proposes that 
despite doubt about the discourse's success in stating truths, it has some 
other function for which it should be preserved. The expressivist, in con-
trast, is not suggesting that the discourse is in any way defective: it is not 
the discourse's function to state truths but only to express attitudes. 
Notably, both J. M. Soskice and William Alston gloss over this distinction. 
They group instrumentalism together with expressivism as a form of anti-
realism. Alston speaks of "expressivism-instrumentalisml/30 while Soskice 
contrasts theological realists with "theological instrumentalists ... those 
who believe that religious language provides a useful, even uniquely use-
ful, system of symbols which is action-guiding for the believer but not to 
be taken as making reference to a cosmos-transcending being in the tradi-
tional sense.I/31 The confusion results from the fact that the secondary func-
tion that the instrumentalist claims the discourse has may be that it 
expresses attitudes. However, while error theorists and non-factualists 
about religion may regard religious discourse as useful and worthy of pre-
serving, their accounts of the cognitive status and primary function of the 
discourse will be importantly different. 
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III. Religious Expressivism 
Was Wittgenstein an expressivist about religious discourse? A strong 
case can be made for it (just as it has been made by Blackburn for 
Wittgenstein on mathematical, ethical and aesthetic discourse).32 Such an 
interpretation reasonably draws on Wittgenstein's repeated insistence that 
there are decisive dissimilarities between religious and empirical state-
ments and beliefs, the one theme most obviously shared by his lectures 
and occasional writings on religion. Of course, Wittgenstein does not sug-
gest an assimilation of religious convictions and attitudes, or some com-
plex of attitudes and factual beliefs as Braithwaite thought. Indeed, 
Wittgenstein explicitly ruled out such a proposal when Casimir Lewy sug-
gested it in the course of one of his lectures. 
Suppose someone, before going to China, when he might never 
see me again, said to me: "We might see one another after death" -
would I necessarily say that I don't understand him? I might say 
[want to say] simply, "Yes. I understand him entirely." 
Lewy "In this case, you might only mean that he expressed a cer-
tain attitude." 
I would say "No, it isn't the same as saying 'I'm very fond of you'" 
- and it may not be the same as saying anything else. It says what it 
says. Why should you be able to substitute anything else? 
Suppose I say: "The man used a picture." (LC33 pp. 70-71) 
It is surprising that these comments have been widely taken if not as a con-
clusive proof that Wittgenstein rejected religious expressivism, then at least 
as a basis for supposing that Wittgenstein took expressivism as an unhelp-
ful way of looking at the matter. Peter Winch,34 D. Z. Phillips,3S and Hilary 
Putnam36 each quote Wittgenstein's dismissal of Lewy's suggestion as 
proof of Wittgenstein's resistance to religious convictions being reduced to 
or replaced with attitudes, and on that basis turn their attention away from 
expressivist interpretations of Wittgenstein. Of course, in the first part of 
this they are quite right: Wittgenstein was not in the business of giving 
reductionist accounts of religious claims. But why shouldn't the irre-
ducibility and irreplaceability of religious utterances naturally emerge 
from attitudes and other states that the expressivist has to work with, along 
with all the features of their propositional surface? Wittgenstein's remarks 
do not imply otherwise; he is not saying, for instance, that religious convic-
tions are just like ordinary beliefs. That is something on which he specifi-
cally casts doubt: "one doesn't use 'believe' as one does ordinarily." (LC p. 
59) Rather, Wittgenstein proposes that a religious conviction is akin to 
being in the grip of a picture, which leaves the question about the status of 
religious discourse wide open. It is not hard to find other evidence that 
Wittgenstein's view stands in sympathy with those of the expressivist; 
indeed, as Putnam concedes, just about everything else in the lectures can 
be read in support of expressivism.37 
Wittgenstein discusses religious beliefs at some length, and specifically 
the case of someone believing in the Last Judgement. There are, he suggests, 
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crucial differences between such beliefs and scientifically based beliefs, or 
ordinary beliefs about states of affairs (he gives the example "There is a 
German aeroplane overhead.") While religious believers may speak of "evi-
dence" and "historical events," the evidence and events cited in connection 
with a religious belief do not constitute a reason to hold that belief in the 
way that evidence given in support of a hypothesis gives a reason to believe 
that the hypothesis is true. In religious discourse "reasons look entirely dif-
ferent from normal reasons," (LC p. 56) religious belief is not "a matter of 
reasonability," (LC p. 58) religious beliefs are not hypotheses or opinions, 
they are not properly spoken of as objects of knowledge or as having a high 
probability (LC p. 57), and when historical facts are introduced "they are 
not treated as historical, empirical, propositions." (LC p. 57) However, 
Wittgenstein is not inviting an error theory of religious discourse: 
It can happen, and often does today, that a person will give up a 
pradice after he has recognized an error on which it was based. But 
this happens only when calling someone's attention to his error is 
enough to tum him from his way of behaving. But this is not the case 
with the religious practices of a people and therefore there is no ques-
tion of an error. (P()38 p. 121) 
The claims of other religious believers in other religions are not in error 
either: 
Was Augustine in error, then, when he called upon God on every 
page of the Confessions? 
But - one might say - if he was not in error, surely the Buddhist 
holy man was - or anyone else - whose religions give expression to 
completely different views. But none of them was in error, except 
when he set forth a theory. (PO p. 119) 
Here Wittgenstein seems at pains to emphasise the contrast between reli-
gious discourse and other fact stating discourses, indeed, he implies that 
when taken (or where offered) as reporting facts religious claims are in 
error. Elsewhere, Wittgenstein suggests that those "errors" would be just 
too big for this factual interpretation of them to be credible; that such 
claims are made by intelligent and reasonable people stands as a reason for 
doubting that religious statements report facts (LC pp. 61-3, 59). 
As the expressivist will observe, Wittgenstein is careful to point out that 
when the propositional surface of religious and scientific discourse is simi-
lar, for example, when one speaks in religious discourse of truth and evi-
dence and historical facts, this does not show that religious claims possess 
truth apt content. For instance, it is possible to reject what somebody says 
they believe - in the Last Judgement, say - and believe the opposite. 
Wittgenstein's explanation of this aspect of the propositional surface of 
religious discourse should be quite amenable to the expressivist. In the reli-
gious case, he suggests, one might not share the same outlook as the 
believer in the Last Judgement, one might find it disagreeable, even moral-
ly disagreeable and "you can call it believing the opposite," (LC p. 55), but 
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one cannot in the ordinary sense "contradict it." The point is driven home 
by Wittgenstein's proposals for the function of religious beliefs. Religious 
belief is "like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, 
although it's belief, it's really a way of living, or a way of assessing life." 
(CV39 p. 64) This is brought out in his comments on the doctrine of predes-
tination. The doctrine, he suggests, is "less a theory that a sigh, or a cry," 
(CV p. 30) and while the doctrine may be called "true," "it is not permissi-
ble for someone to assert it as a truth, unless he himself says it in torment." 
(CV p. 30) Taking the statement "It is God's will," Wittgenstein claims: 
"The work done by this sentence, or at any rate something like it, could 
also be done by a command!" (CV p. 61) 
IV. Minimal Realism 
There is, however, another way of looking at the matter. According to 
the minimal realist interpretation, Wittgenstein's description of the differ-
ences between religious and empirical claims was not aimed to establish 
the different status or function of religious and empirical discourse. Rather, 
he was elucidating the different grammar appropriate to these fields of dis-
course.40 Wittgenstein does not use scientific discourse as a model for stan-
dards of truth and description against which religious discourse palpably 
falls short, but as an object of comparison against which the distinctive fea-
tures of religious discourse can be articulated. Wittgenstein's point, argues 
the minimal realist, is not that religious statements are in no respect 
descriptive: they are descriptive (or at least some of them are), but are they 
are not scientific descriptions, and they may be true, but not in the way that 
scientific hypotheses may be true. Far from reinforcing the kind of meta-
physical differences between different discourses in which the non-realist 
trades, Wittgenstein undermines these differences. We can speak of reli-
gious truth, reference, reality, etc., as well as, though not in the same way 
as, scientific truth, reference, facts, etc. Notions of truth and reference do 
not make weighty philosophical demands on the discourses in which they 
successfully operate. So there is no question that religious discourse, as 
well as ethical and other discourses, have statements that successfully 
refer, describe, are true, etc. We must look instead to the way in which 
truth and reference function in religious discourse, to find out what these 
terms amount to. This interpretation is supported by Wittgenstein's own 
minimal account of truth: 
'p' is true = p 
'p' is false = not-po 
And to say that a proposition is whatever can be true or false 
amounts to saying: we call something a proposition when in our lan-
guage we apply the calculus of truth functions to itY 
One way of developing the approach suggested here has been set out 
with impressive clarity by Sabina Lovibond for ethical discourse. 
According to Lovibond, 
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What Wittgenstein offers us, in the Philosophical Investigations and 
elsewhere in his later work, is a homogenous or 'seamless' concep-
tion of language. It is a conception free from invidious comparisons 
between different regions of discourse ... On this view, the only 
legitimate role for the idea of 'reality' is that in which it is coordinated 
with (or, as Wittgenstein might have said - d. Philosophical 
Investigations 136 - 'belongs with') the metaphysically neutral idea of 
'talking about something' 
Wittgenstein's view of language implicitly denies any metaphysical 
role to the idea of 'reality'; it denies that we can draw any intelligible 
distinction between those parts of assertoric discourse which do, and 
those which do not, genuinely describe reality.42 
The argument is substantiated with a minimal account of those features -
description, reference, truth - that the expressivist may claim that the dis-
course lacks: 
If something has the form of a proposition, then it is a proposition: 
philosophical considerations cannot discredit the way in which we 
classify linguistic entities for other, non-philosophical purposes ... 
The only way, then, in which an indicative statement can fail to 
describe reality is by not being true - i.e. in virtue of reality not being 
as the statement declares it to be ... 43 
So provided that the sentences of a discourse satisfy certain grammatical 
features, they have truth apt content. There is no deeper level at which to 
draw a distinction between those discourses with sentences with truth apt 
content and those without. What are the required features? In general, sen-
tences with an assertoric form can be constructed in it, and those sentences 
are subject to standards of correctness. This approach is, of course, by no 
means restricted to only ethical discourse; it readily extends to religious 
discourse, or any discourse that exhibits the required features. 
Lovibond's argument unsettles the distinctions on which the traditional 
antirealist/ realist dispute is based, and in particular distinctions between 
the different cognitive status of discourses on which the non-factualist 
argument depends. If Lovibond is right, no metaphysical argument need 
be won for the indicative claims of the disputed discourse to qualify for 
truth aptness, descriptiveness, etc., albeit of a metaphysically lightweight 
variety; they qualify on grammatical grounds alone. Furthermore, none of 
the discourses that are the subject of philosophical controversy is likely, on 
this account, to fail to produce many true sentences. The error theorist 
could maintain, consistently with minimalism about truth, that sentences 
of the discourse are both truth apt and all false. But it is unclear what rea-
son could be offered in favour of this position, short of a discourse suffer-
ing from some deep internal incoherence in its standards of warrant.44 
Despite its attractiveness as a philosophical position, Lovibond's inter-
pretation is difficult to square with Wittgenstein's own views. Wittgenstein, 
as is well known, was concerned to emphasise the diversity of and differ-
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ences between discourses, or language games. As Simon Blackburn has 
pointed out, he considered taking the quotation "I'll teach you differences" 
from King Lear as the motto for Philosophical Investigations. Lovibond, in con-
trast, seems to achieve realism across the board by showing their uniformi-
ty. If Lovibond is right about Wittgenstein, Blackburn argues: 
One would expect evidence of Wittgenstein saying, in effect, that he 
has had us fooled all along. We thought he was teaching differences, 
but really he was subverting the very differences he seemed to bring 
up. All along he was warning us against thinking that it might be sig-
nificant to try to understand mathematics in terms of rules, ... or to 
suggest that framework propositions might not be true (did we need 
this warning?), or to wonder if religious commitment or ethics 
expressed emotional and other cognitive states, and so on. There are 
no such differences! His motto is: I'll teach you samenesses!45 
However, the central point about Wittgenstein can be well taken without 
going along with Blackburn's account of the differences that Wittgenstein 
was trying to teach us. That is, Wittgenstein can be understood as explicat-
ing differences between scientific discourse, and ethical or religious dis-
course, without thereby seeking to cast doubt on the appropriateness of 
classifying ethical or religious claims as true or false, referential, or descrip-
tive. Rather than introducing a metaphysical standard for truth, that some 
region of discourse might fail to meet, Wittgenstein was setting out the dif-
ferent ways in which the concept of truth is used in different regions of dis-
course: religious, scientific, ethical, etc. Wittgenstein is indeed teaching us 
differences: in the variety of uses of this and other philosophically impor-
tant concepts. He offers us a plethora of differences that undermine rather 
than uphold any clear division that the expressivist hopes to make 
between descriptive and non-descriptive functions of discourse. 
This interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy is currently widely sup-
ported. It is briefly endorsed by Crispin Wright, and broadly informs his 
own approach to realism issues in Truth and Objectivity (to which I will 
return later).46 It is defended by Cora Diamond as an approach to ethics and 
mathematics,47 and by Putnam - who calls it "common-sense realism"4Il - for 
mathematics, ethics and, as quoted earlier, philosophy of religion: 
The Wittgensteinian strategy, I believe, is to argue that while there is 
such a thing as correctness in ethics, in interpretation, in mathematics, 
the way to understand that is not by trying to model it on the ways in 
which we get things right in physics, but by trying to understand the 
life we lead with our concepts in each of these distinct areas. 
According to D. Z. Phillips, 
by all means say that 'God' functions as a referring expression, that 
'God' refers to a sort of object, that God's reality is a matter of fact, 
and so on. But please remember that, as yet, no conceptual or grammatical 
clarification has taken place. We have all the work still to do since we 
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shall now have to show, in this religious context, what speaking of 
'reference', 'object', 'existence', and so on amotu1.ts to, how it differs, 
in obvious ways, from other uses of these terms.49 
Rush Rhees50 and Peter Winch51 also seem sympathetic to this kind of inter-
pretation. 
This is not to say, of course, that there are not also significant points on 
which there is disagreement. Phillips, for example, appears to take "true" to 
mean something different in different discourses, presumably with the 
upshot that the term is ambiguous: we have multiple truth concepts, with 
different extensions.52 Wright argues, in contrast, that the truth predicate has 
certain minimal and sufficient conditions for its use, in particular, DS; on 
this, as we have seen, Wittgenstein seems to concur. It is not clear what case 
there is in favour of Phillips's relativism about truth. No doubt there may be 
many different kinds of truths, but the concept of truth need not vary as we 
consider different ranges of cases. Wright suggests that we could neverthe-
less accept the minimal conditions for a truth predicate while allowing that 
truth should constitute something different in different regions of discourse. 
That is, truth may exhibit certain additional features distinctive of its use in 
particular discourses. By way of comparison, Wright gives the notion of 
identity. Identity may be grotu1.ded in the two principles that everything is 
self-identical and identical things share their properties, but what consti-
tutes identity will depend on whether we are dealing with material objects, 
numbers, people, etc.'3 For instance, we may suppose that the identity of 
physical objects invariably consists in temporal and spatial continuity, and 
that numerical identity is established by the one to one correspondence rela-
tion, and that personal identity consists in something else again. But the dif-
ferent local features of identity that depend on the range of objects we are 
considering do not give us a reason to suppose that we are dealing with dif-
ferent concepts of identity in each case. 
This disagreement gives rise to a second point of contention. For Wright 
proposes that the different ways in which truth is constituted in different 
discourses have a bearing on the realism/antirealism debate. From the 
minimal starting point of satisfying DS, truth may possess certain addition-
al realism-relevant features. Truth in ethics, for example, may exhibit cer-
tain features different to truth in science that justify a realist position for 
scientific discourse but not for ethical discourse. So far from minimal real-
ism putting the argument about realism/non-realism to rest, as Phillips 
and others suppose, it forms the starting point from which arguments with 
the realist can be engaged. The issue, according to Wright, is whether the 
truth predicate supported by the disputed discourse is just minimal truth 
or something more robust. The debate can be pursued with such questions 
as: can there be truths in the discourse that cannot be discovered? Is there 
anything more to a claim being true than our being justified in asserting it? 
Are true claims mostly caused or explained by the facts they assert? Are 
differences of opinion in the discourse usually the result of one or more 
parties misrepresenting the facts? To take just the first question, on the 
minimal realist's accotu1.t of truth, truth may be consistently be identified 
with warranted assertibility (or some other epistemic notion). This is some-
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thing that a realist may wish to rule out on the grounds that, for example, 
there are religious truths that are in principle beyond our ability to deter-
mine as true. So in Wright's framework for the realist debate, minimal real-
ism is an anti-realist position, inviting the realist to defend positive answers 
to one or more of these questions. I will return to this in Section 6. 
v. Wittgenstein and Realism 
We are faced with two substantially different interpretations of 
Wittgenstein's writings, and little explicit guidance from Wittgenstein as to 
which is correct. Wittgenstein writes, "I would like to say: the attitude comes 
before the opinion. (Isn't belief in God an attitude?),"54 but here it unclear 
whether the question should be taken as rhetorical or whether it is intended 
to provoke disagreement. Elsewhere, Wittgenstein asserts "Not empiricism 
and yet realism in philosophy, that is the hardest thing. (Against Ramsey),"SS 
but this has also been given different interpretations.56 It is perhaps to be 
expected that Wittgenstein would not offer a direct statement of support for 
minimal realism or expressivism, but the problem of determining which 
strategy Wittgenstein employs becomes acute when it is seen that much of 
his work in philosophy of religion can form part of either approach. 
Consider, for instance, what Wittgenstein says about religious belief. On 
the expressivist reading, the differences that Wittgenstein shows us 
between religious and scientific belief (outlined in Section 3) are taken to 
indicate that expressions of religious conviction and expressions of scientif-
ic belief do not have the same cognitive function. This may in tum be seen 
to invite the quasi-realist to explain, from an expressivist starting point, 
how we come to talk of ''belief'' in religious discourse at all. On the mini-
mal realist reading, the differences that Wittgenstein shows us in the way 
that religious and scientific belief relate to evidence, are treated in argu-
ment, and are subject to disagreement, etc., is seen as the basis for a 
descriptive account of religious conviction which shows it to be both gen-
uine (factual, truth apt, etc.) and distinct from scientific belief: neither 
merely pseudo-scientific and superstitious, nor quasi-belief. Notably, much 
of the evidence that is put forward in the prosecution of the expressivist's 
interpretation of Wittgenstein can be read in these terms. 
Certainly, a great deal of exegetical work is needed to get Wittgenstein 
to look like either an expressivist or minimal realist. The expressivist can 
take heart from Wittgenstein's remarks in his other writings on avowals 
and ethics, where some expressivist intention on Wittgenstein's part is dif-
ficult to deny. But there is no indication that Wittgenstein faced up to the 
kind of quasi-realist project that would be required if he were to keep to his 
stated aim of not interfering in the actual use of language. If the differences 
between religious and scientific discourse are supposed to be indicative of 
the expressive function of religious discourse, we are entitled to know how 
it is - to name just one difficulty mentioned earlier - that religious state-
ments can be embedded in conditionals and regimented into valid argu-
ments. Minimal realists, in contrast, can draw support for their interpreta-
tion from Wittgenstein's aim to describe rather than change the grammar 
of our language. But in his investigation into the local features of different 
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discourses, Wittgenstein shows little of the kind of attention to truth, reali-
ty or descriptiveness that one would expect if he tlid indeed wish to restore 
our faith in plain speaking realism. 
Wittgenstein's minimal account of truth, and his apparent sympathy for 
philosophical minimalism in general, might seem to tell in favour of the 
minimal realist's interpretation. But this conclusion is premature, for the 
reason mentioned in Section One. Minimalism about truth is consistent 
with an expressivist account of the function of religious discourse provided 
we are not also minimalists about truth aptness. A commitment to minimal 
truth, therefore, does not lead into minimal realism, if the sentences of reli-
gious discourse are not used to express propositions but have some other 
expressive function. As Blackburn puts it: "a thin theory of truth can con-
sort with a thick theory of judgement, ascribing a variety of functional roles 
to the commitments that on the surface all get expressed by equally well-
behaved indicative sentences."57 Furthermore, Blackburn argues, 
Wittgenstein, like Frank Ramsey, is working with a robust notion of truth 
aptness (or proposition). Whether or not Blackburn is right on this latter 
point, the evidence of Wittgenstein's minimalism is not enough to show 
that he was also a minimal realist. 
VI. Religious Realism 
It is tempting to conclude that Wittgenstein did not satisfactorily address 
the expressivism/minimal realism issue in philosophy of religion (and in 
other fields where a similar doubt about his objectives arises); either that, or 
he was sympathetic to one or other position, but left much of the argument 
unstated. In either case, Wittgenstein's investigations in the philosophy of 
religion look like philosophically incomplete work. However, the distinc-
tion between minimal realism and religious expressivism is not as clear-cut 
as it first seems. For there is an important similarity between the objectives 
of these two strategies. They both aim to be in some degree subversive of 
the traditional realist/non-realist debate. They propose that those claims 
about a discourse that are usually taken to be distinctive of a realist position 
can be made either (in the case of the expressivist) without compromising 
non-factualist principles, or (in the case of the minimal realist) without com-
mitting oneself to metaphysical realism. In this respect, the strategies seem 
to be successful. At the very least, the onus is on the realist who does take 
realism to be philosophically substantive and inconsistent with expres-
sivism to state a position that is philosophically substantive and to which 
expressivists would not anyway subscribe. 
It can also be seen that expressivism and minimal realism, as I have 
been calling it, are both positions that can comfortably be occupied by anti-
realists. The main difference between them lies in where the debate with 
the realist is situated. The expressivist resists the view that the claims of 
religious discourse are truth apt, and attempts to explain those features of 
the discourse (i.e. its propositional surface) which suggest otherwise. The 
minimal realist finds no problem with the discourse possessing a proposi-
tional surface and sees no need to explain it, but resists the assumption that 
the truth predicate operative within the discourse is more robust than min-
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imal truth, i.e. more robust than a predicate given by DS and any related 
platitudes.58 So on both interpretations, Wittgenstein's work in philosophy 
of religion stands as a force for anti-realism, though one which can be 
developed in two different ways. 
While identifying Wittgenstein's remarks on religion - or at least the 
two ways of developing these remarks - as anti-realist, may confirm the 
suspicions of realist detractors of Wittgenstein, the varieties of anti-realism 
in question are of a sufficiently sophisticated sort to provide a serious chal-
lenge to the realist position. For the realist's traditional claims that "God 
exists" is true or that it refers or it is a fact or that God really exists will clear-
ly not do the work required of them. Both minimal realist and expressivist 
will slip through the net. The minimal realist will take these claims as 
insubstantial platitudes - "philosophy by italics" as D. Z. Phillips puts it -
and proceed to give them a philosophically harmless reading. The expres-
sivist could also make use of the minimalist account of these claims, but in 
any case should in principle be able to take them on board as part of the 
propositional surface of religious discourse, without any implications for 
its real function that are inconsistent with expressivism. 
What of the two "standard criticisms" mentioned in Section One? While 
they may stand as an effective response to some accounts of Wittgenstein's 
work, without further development they offer little resistance to the interpre-
tations considered in this paper. If Wittgenstein is after all offering a repack-
aged form of non-cognitivism, it is of a sophisticated form that the argu-
ments typically raised against Braithwaite fall short of addressing. These 
arguments typically assume that any non-factualist theory would be unable 
to accommodate many of the central and supposedly metaphysical claims 
that religious believers wish to make, with the consequence that these claims 
must be given an eccentric interpretation or simply rejected. Certainly, some 
religious non-factualists have proposed such measures (Don Cupitt is a case 
in point).59 But this does not seem to be what Wittgenstein is saying, and is 
clearly nor something that the expressivist would concede. The expressivist 
takes on board the whole body of seemingly realist conviction and argument 
in a discourse with the aim of showing how it has emerged from the expres-
sion of attitudes subject to various practical pressures. To refute the expres-
sivist, the realist will need to identify something which clearly indicates that 
religious statements are truth apt. For example, a central component of reli-
gious discourse that the quasi-realist story cannot explain. 
As to the suggestion that Wittgenstein was a fideist arbitrarily sealing 
off religious language games from scientific criticism, this looks somewhat 
oversimplified. Wittgenstein's position, on the minimal realist's interpreta-
tion, is not that we lack grounds for distinguishing true from false or 
descriptive from non-descriptive religious statements, but that these are 
not scientific grounds, and they are not scientific techniques that are used 
for making the distinctions. So Wittgenstein's observation of the non-scien-
tific character of at least some of the standards at work in religious dis-
course is not in itself a philosophically substantive (antirealist) conclusion. 
Rather, it is up to the realist critic of Wittgenstein to show where his obser-
vations go astray, or miss the point of religious claims. Certainly, there is 
evidence that some religious claims can sustain a scientific interpretation. 
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But it is prima facie doubtful that very much could be made of this evi-
dence, as is indicated by the large amount of philosophical labour involved 
in trying to set up a scientifically respectable representation of religious 
beliefs. Of course, the critic's objection is often not about the kinds of stan-
dards that are currently applicable in religion, but rather that scientific 
standards should be applicable to religious statements, as the proper basis 
on which to test their truth. But in this case, we are at least entitled to know 
what is wrong with the standards that already inform religious discourse. 
Assuming that these standards are at least coherent and workable, why 
should we replace or supplement them with standards that would result in 
many religious statements being highly suspect if not false? Similar 
responses might be made in defence of mathematics, ethics, folk psycholo-
gy and other discourses. Why, for instance, should truths established in 
mathematics (i.e. proved mathematical statements) be compromised 
because of their failure to satisfy certain other scientific questions concern-
ing the existence of mathematical entities? 
These brief remarks are, of course, intended only as an indication of 
some of the problems that will need to be addressed if the traditional criti-
cisms of Wittgenstein's writings on religion are to be developed into con-
vincing responses to Wittgensteinian expressivism or minimal realism. 
However, it is possible that the religious realist will wish to pursue a differ-
ent course, one which rejects expressivism and minimal realism and 
accepts the differences between religion and science. This would be to 
argue that religious truth is not minimal, as has been supposed. The argu-
ment would be that religious truth in addition to satisfying the minimal 
constraints, exhibits certain realism relevant features, such as those 
described by Wright and outlined at the end of section 4. For example, can 
there be unknowable religious truths? If so, then religious truth cannot be 
just a matter of what is justified in religious discourse. A convincing case 
on these lines has yet to be made/o in philosophy of religion it remains 
largely unexplored territory.ol 
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